Introduction
Stakeholder theory (Hill and Jones, 1992) focuses on the importance of a firm's relationship with stakeholders. Relationships with various stakeholder groups like customers, employees and the community affect firm performance whether or not those stakeholder groups share in ownership rights. Effectively responding to and managing these stakeholder relationships is critical to success. Successful relationships are based on trust, and trust is created and maintained by meeting and exceeding responsibilities to stakeholders. Corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in this process. They build and maintain trust by ensuring that responsibilities are either met or exceeded. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley reforms are efforts to repair public trust by improving governance mechanisms assuring financial reporting responsibilities to various stakeholders. Does improved governance further improve trust by assuring that other stakeholder and social responsibilities besides financial reporting responsibilities are met? Does governance improve other dimensions of performance besides financial performance? IJLMA 57, 1 In this study, we examine the relationship between corporate governance and social responsibility. We posit that:
• corporate governance is positively associated with social responsibility; and • good corporate governance leads to good future social responsibility.
We measure corporate governance by using the corporate governance index provided by Caylor (2006, 2009) . Corporate social responsibility (CSR) data come from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD), Inc. Our study documents significant evidence to support a positive association between corporate governance and social responsibility. In addition, the results suggest good corporate governance leads to good social responsibility in the following year. Our paper delivers new evidence on the link between corporate governance and social responsibility. It integrates and contributes to the corporate governance literature and emerging accounting literature on CSR. The results should interest managers who engage in behavior leading to or maintaining strong corporate governance mechanisms, financial analysts who conduct research on corporate governance and firm performance and policymakers who design and implement guidelines on corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, results in this study can increase individual investors' confidence in investing in companies with stronger corporate governance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design, including measurement of primary variables and empirical specification. Section 4 describes sample selection and descriptive statistics, while Section 5 reports the results from our regression analyses. Section 6 reports supplemental tests, and Section 7 summarizes the study.
issuance of CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error. Kim et al. (2012) document a positive relation between CSR and earnings quality, suggesting that socially responsible firms have higher earnings quality. In summary, the above CSR studies suggest that engaging in CSR activities may bring future benefits to firms.
Review on governance
Corporate governance is important to a firm's performance and success. Much of the research in this area documents how corporate governance mechanisms affect dimensions of financial reporting and performance. Abdel-Khalik (2002) proposed post-Enron governance reforms to, among other things, improve auditor selection, retention and compensation. Recent work also documents financial reporting benefits from corporate governance. For example, there is less information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007) , and the quality of information available to financial analysts increases with higher levels of corporate governance (Byard et al., 2006) . Given these reporting benefits, the determinants of good reporting governance have been investigated and documented. Board of Directors and audit committee characteristics like independence (Jaggi et al., 2009; Bronson et al., 2009) and expertise (DeZoort et al., 2003, Gul and Leung, 2004; Kelton et al., 2008) ensure good governance and high-quality financial reporting. Do corporate governance mechanisms have similar positive effects on other dimensions of firm performance besides financial reporting?
Stakeholder theory (Hill and Jones, 1992) focuses on the importance of stakeholder relationships and recognizes stakeholders' impact on firm sustainability and success. A stakeholder can be thought of as a "group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) . Because stakeholder relationships affect organization objectives, they are important. Effective stakeholder relationships are based on trust. Trust in these relationships is built and maintained by continually meeting and exceeding responsibilities. Effective corporate governance plays an important role in facilitating effective stakeholder relationships. Corporate governance builds and maintains stakeholder trust by assuring that firm responsibilities are met and exceeded.
Empirical research on corporate governance suggests a positive link between corporate governance and different dimensions of firm performance. Good governance protects shareholder interests and reduces principal-agent problems (Riyanto and Toolsema, 2007) . Specifically, Brown and Caylor (2009) argue that good corporate governance creates a system of greater control over managerial actions, which, in turn, should reduce principal-agent problems and improve trust. As a result, Brown and Caylor (2009) find that governance improves operating performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). They rely on data from Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) to create a firm-specific corporate governance measure known as Gov-Score. Unlike other governance indexes, Gov-Score is based on both internal and external factors.
Corporate governance may be related to other dimensions of performance like dimensions of corporate social performance in addition to operating performance. While the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance has received attention, governance's relationship with CSR has largely gone unexplored. Recent work has begun to explore the relationship between corporate governance and specific IJLMA 57,1 dimensions of CSR like environmental performance. Stuebs and Sun (2010) find that governance is positively associated with a firm's environmental strengths. Earnhart (2002) finds that concentrated ownership improves environmental performance. The idea is that concentrated ownership creates strong governance which facilitates better cost management, including environmental cost management. We extend this work by investigating the following question: What is the relationship between corporate governance and CSR? This question leads to the two following hypotheses in this paper:
H1. Corporate governance is positively associated with social responsibility performance.
H2. Good corporate governance leads to good social responsibility performance. Caylor's (2006, 2009) Gov-Score measure and KLD's CSR data are used to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and CSR. Figure 1 We also include five control variables to control for firm size, age of long-term assets, leverage, return on assets and the market-to-book ratio. The next two sections provide details on how we measure the primary variables of interest in this study, i.e. CSR and corporate governance.
Research design and variable description

Measurement of the primary dependent variable -CSR
KLD, a Boston-based consulting firm, has been actively providing rating data on CSR since 1991. KLD data are an influential measure of CSR. While many investment managers rely on KLD data when making social screening, the KLD data are also frequently used in academic literature. It is "the largest multidimensional corporate social performance database available to the public and is used extensively in research on corporate social performance" (Deckop et al., 2006, p. 334) . KLD accumulates CSR information for more firms than other CSR data sources. It has become "the de facto corporate social performance research standard at the moment" (Waddock, 2003, p. 369) . KLD provides rating data for approximately 80 variables in 7 qualitative areas for each selected firm. The seven areas include community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product. For each qualitative variable, positive ratings indicate strengths, and negative ratings indicate concerns. For example, the environment area contains six strength items (beneficial products, pollution prevention, recycling, clean energy, property plant and equipment and other strengths) and six concern items (hazardous waste, regulatory problems, ozone depleting chemicals, substantial emissions, agriculture chemicals and other concerns). In addition to these seven qualitative areas, KLD also evaluates six controversial issues that include, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco activities. Involvement in any of these six controversial issues results in a negative rating. A complete listing strengths and concerns for KLD variables is provided in the Table AI. Consistent with prior research (Chen et al., 2008; Cho et al., 2006; Deckop et al., 2006; Nelling and Webb, 2009; Ruf et al., 2001; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Shropshire and Hillman, 2007; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Graves and Waddock, 1994) , we subtract total concerns from total strengths and assign equal
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Corporate governance and social responsibility importance/weight to each area in calculating the KLD index score. This approach is also suggested by KLD [1] .
The KLD index score is computed as follows: KLD ϭ (Total strengths of CommunityTotal concerns of Community) ϩ (Total strengths of Corporate Governance -Total concerns of Corporate Governance) ϩ (Total strengths of Diversity -Total concerns of Diversity) ϩ (Total strengths of Employee Relations -Total concerns of Employee Relations) ϩ (Total strengths of Environment -Total concerns of Environment) ϩ (Total strengths of Human Rights -Total concerns of Human Rights) ϩ (Total strengths of Product -Total concerns of Product) Ϫ Any concerns of Alcohol -Any concerns of Gambling -Any concerns of Firearm -Any concerns of Military -Any concerns of Nuclear Power -Any concerns of Tobacco.
Measurement of the primary independent variable -corporate governance scores
ISS developed a measure of corporate governance strength using 61 variables grouped into the following eight areas:
(1) board structure and composition; (2) audit issues; ISS gathers data from public sources, and companies can also provide ISS with updated or corrected data. Caylor (2006, 2009) used the ISS data to create a summary score, known as Gov-Score, to measure the strength of corporate governance. They selected 51 variables, and coded each of the 51 variables as either 0 or 1, depending on whether or not ISS considers the firm's governance to be minimally acceptable. Caylor (2006, 2009 ) then aggregated those 51 binary variables to create a firm-specific summary score. Thus, a Gov-Score ranges from 0 to 51. Gov-Scores are generously provided by Caylor (2006, 2009) . Interested users can freely download the data from their Web site [2] .
Empirical specification
We use the governance score (GOV) and KLD's social responsibility index score (KLD) in the following regression models to test the association between corporate governance and social responsibility (i.e. H1) in equation (1) and to test whether corporate governance leads to social responsibility (i.e. H2) in equation (2)[3]:
Where: KLD it ϭ social responsibility index score for firm i in year t; GOV it ϭ corporate governance score of firm i in year t; GOV it-1 ϭ corporate governance score of firm i in year t-1; SALES it ϭ net sales (Compustat Item #12) of firm i in year t; AGE it ϭ net property, plant and equipment (Compustat Item #8)/Gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat Item #7) of firm i in year t; LEV it ϭ leverage ratio [total liabilities (Compustat Item #9 ϩ #34)/total assets (Compustat Item #6)] of firm i in year t; ROA it ϭ return on assets [income before extraordinary items -available for common equity (Compustat Item #237)/total assets (Compustat Item #6)] of firm i in year t; and MTB it ϭ market-to-book ratio {[common shares outstanding (Compustat Item #25) ϫ stock price -fiscal year-end (Compustat Item #199)]/total common equity (Compustat Item #60)} of firm i in year t.
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The social responsibility index score (KLD) is the independent variable of interest. Five control variables are included to control for firm size, the age of long-term assets, leverage, return on assets and the market-to-book ratio.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We obtain the list of firms with corporate Gov-Scores from the Web site described by Caylor (2006, 2009 Table III provide initial evidence supporting our two hypotheses.
Results
We use regression analyses to further test our hypotheses. The regression model in equation (1) is used to test our first hypothesis and results are reported in Panel A of Table IV , the current year's governance coefficient (␣ 1 ) is positive (0.0427) and significant (p ϭ 0.0004) which supports our first hypothesis of a positive association between corporate governance and social responsibility. Panel B reports that the lagged governance coefficient (␣ 1 ) is also positive (0.0538) and strongly significant (p ϭ 0.0001) which supports our second hypothesis that good governance leads to good social responsibility. Our regression results provide significant evidence (p Ͻ 0.01) to support these two hypotheses. Overall, good corporate governance is positively associated with good social responsibility performance and leads to good social responsibility performance. The regression analyses include five control variables. In particular, we include ROA as a control variable, as Brown and Caylor (2009) report a significantly positive association between GOV and ROA. Panel A of Table IV reports a significantly positive relation between CSR (KLD) and ROA and MTB, and a significantly negative association between KLD and LEV. Panel B of Table IV reports a significantly negative relation between CSR (KLD) and AGE and LEV and a 
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Corporate governance and social responsibility significantly positive association between KLD and MTB. In addition, we also checked the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and multicollinearity is not an issue in our models.
Supplemental tests
To test the robustness of our results to alternative corporate governance measures, we reran our empirical tests using KLD's net governance score instead of Caylor's (2006, 2009) Table IV . In general, ROA and MTB are positive and AGE and LEV are negative. In summary, the additional regression results in Table V provide strong support for our first hypothesis and insignificant support for our second hypothesis. 
